[WP1] Evidence in epistemology

Extant epistemological theories of evidence construe its relation to truth, knowledge, logical inference, and justification in a variety of ways. They disagree on such issues as whether evidence is factive (that p is part of one’s evidence implies that p is true), whether one’s evidence is what one knows, whether it is sufficient in order for p to be justified that the probability of p conditional on the evidence E be high, and whether evidence is luminous, i.e. on whether p is part of one’s evidence only if one is in a position to know that p is part of one’s evidence. Resolution of such questions has consequences for our understanding of epistemic rationality and the correct conception of norms for belief.

WP leader
Sven Rosenkranz (ICREA/UB).
Senior members
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (UB), José Martínez (UB), Dario Mortini (UB), Sergi Oms (UB), Manuel Pérez Otero (UB), Oscar Piedrahita (UB).
Student members
Davide Botticchio (UB), Martí Bridgewater (UB), Andrés Díaz (UB), Marc Lara (UB), Elena Menta (UB), Niccolò Rossi (UB).