[WP1] Evidence in epistemology

Extant epistemological theories of evidence construe its relation to truth, knowledge, logical inference, and justification in a variety of ways. They disagree on such issues as whether evidence is factive (that p is part of one’s evidence implies that p is true), whether one’s evidence is what one knows, whether it is sufficient in order for p to be justified that the probability of p conditional on the evidence E be high, and whether evidence is luminous, i.e. on whether p is part of one’s evidence only if one is in a position to know that p is part of one’s evidence. Resolution of such questions has consequences for our understanding of epistemic rationality and the correct conception of norms for belief.

WP leader: Sven Rosenkranz (ICREA/UB).
Senior members: Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (UB), José Martínez (UB), Dario Mortini (UB), Sergi Oms (UB), Manuel Pérez Otero (UB), Oscar Piedrahita (UB).
Student members: Davide Botticchio (UB), Martí Bridgewater (UB), Andrés Díaz (UB), Marc Lara (UB), Elena Menta (UB), Niccolò Rossi (UB).